The contrivances of 'Recall' and 'Precision' are customarily used to assess the effectiveness of document retrieval systems. Despite their extensive use in experiments, including the recent TREC experiments, and their dominance in mathematical discussions of system performance, there has been continual questioning
Introduction
Human life is governed by personal and public knowledge, and the feedstock and determinants of knowledge are the processes we term 'information'. Our individual and social systems have found it necessary (or at least efficient) to embody aspects of the knowledge in individual minds in, and as, 'documents', which may be regarded as representing semi-permanent, coded, and public representations of knowledge. It is the proliferation of the objects we call documents, coupled with our perceptions that we need access to them, that have led to the discipline we call 'information storage and retrieval' and to the technologies and systems•computer based, organisation-based, and tacit knowledge based•that attempt to facilitate such access. The research topic we term 'the evaluation of IR systems', which has attracted so much experimental and theoretical work, is motivated by the individual and social realities just referred to. It is, however, a party to various as yet unresolved tensions and uncertainties, perhaps inevitable in any young discipline, and even a defining property of one? At a broad level, these uncertainties relate to the kind of thinking that we should be bringing to the topic. Should we, for example, turn to the social sciences or computer science, say, for our thinking models, or should we develop these de novo?. At a more specific level, there has been a longstanding concern as to what the most suitable variables are with which to characterise search effectiveness. Some of the issues here are: 1. Whether numeric variables ('measures') should be used at all to measure system effectiveness, and whether the whole field has not been prematurely mathematised. 2. Whether just one or two optimal variables (whether numeric, logical or categorical) should be used to characterise search effectiveness, or many variables? Given the subtleties, complexity and dynamics of knowledge and information•and people•should we not be taking more of a 'horses for courses' stance in choosing our evaluation variables? Perhaps we have too quickly turned our back on the social sciences, with their concerns for contexts, openness in system definition, and recognition of system uniquenesses and non-
Pre-mathematical concepts

Primitive concepts: 'information' and its ambiguity, and 'relevance'
To reduce the confusion that so easily arises when discussing relevance and information, we prescriptively define 'information' for our present purposes as a process that is created by the human mind in response to sensory data. Harter [7] may have been the first author to construe information in process terms, in the document retrieval context, although the concept may arguably be traced to earlier writings of Shera, Swanson, Buckland, and others. (Harter cites Buckland [18] in regard to the 'process' term.) When emphasis seems appropriate, we will refer to 'information' as 'an information process'. The 'sensory data' of interest to us are, of course, the data perceived Mira '99 3 when a searcher reads (i.e., assimilates, studies) a document. The objective evidence for an information process resulting from an inspection of a document, is verbal behaviour by the searcher to that effect. Theory in our field would surely be strengthened, not weakened, by our adopting such a user-centred approach. However, there seems to be no need for a modeling of processes that can be perceived only subjectively, i.e. intra cognitively, by (higher-order) cognition. It is appreciated that some authors do see such modeling (i.e. models resulting from introspection) as valid, but clearly we cannot build a scientific discipline on unobservables such as 'need' even if this intuitive idea, like 'context', remains a useful primitive in our thinking, i.e. a useful but necessarily undefined root concept. (An analogy could be 'life' for a biologist, who does not define the term but rather deals with well-defined terms such as DNA, genes, habitats, etc.) 'Information' in these terms, is thus equivalent to, or at least a close synonym for, 'learning' taking the latter term at its widest meaning, and it is (to repeat) objective verbal behaviour expressive of learning effects that provide us with the basis for assessing 'information' in these terms. If we say something is 'informative', then we mean that we have learned from it, i.e. adapted ourselves. Not just 'plugged it in' as a 'fact' (i.e. acceptable datum) to a predefined cognitive database. 2 We see 'relevance', on the other hand, as a strictly superfluous (i.e. redundant) concept, since in effect it simply refers to those documents that are party to a searcher's information process. It is retrospectively defined by observed user behaviour. However, it plays a useful intuitive role, and there seems to be no harm in retaining it in pre-formal discussions, given the present, evolving state of the discipline. Granting the concept of 'relevance' a provisional validity, we note that there is now a near consensus, in writings on this concept, that two different sub-concepts can usefully be distinguished. Just what these sub-concepts are, from a document-use point of view, we shall attempt to review below, but we note in passing that the terms used to describe one of them include 'situational relevance' (Wilson [15] ) or 'pertinence' (Kemp [19] ) or 'psychological relevance', 'subjective relevance' [7] , and in the case of the other sub-concept: 'topicality, 'weak relevance' or 'objective relevance' [7] , 'aboutness' (Hutchins [20] ), although Belkin [21] has pointed to ambiguity in usage of the latter term, 'logical relevance' (Cooper [22] ), although Cooper here used the term in a rather more restricted way than this, or (simply) 'relevance' (as in the Cranfield experiments.) The 'default' meaning of 'relevance' in the discipline, at the present time, could be said to be the latter, perhaps again underlining the tall shadow cast by Cranfield thinking on experimental design. When we use the implicitly complex phrase 'search for information' we accordingly mean, under our definition of information-as-process, a search for documents that would contribute to a learning process. The reason for emphasising the word 'contribute' here is that information qua process will clearly be influenced by other factors than the recorded knowledge in the document, for example the searcher's memory, cognitive skills, age and geneticendowment, state of fatigue at the time of search, social and physical context, disposition to reassess views presently held, etc. We elaborate further on this matter below. The problem of defining measures that represent the information process in regard to its support through document provision, is then perhaps one of the most central in our science. Sub-problems at the micro level include those of choosing suitable performance measures, and the macro level include the representation of overall user satisfaction following the document aggregation that is determined by retrieval. The classical probabilistic measures of performance ignore the latter, the whole is seen as simply the sum of the parts. Many persons in the IS&R field•we may perhaps, with respect, refer to them as 'the Cranfield School'•have not regarded 'information' in the above 'process' way. Rather, they have seen information as an inherent (i.e. observerfree, or 'public') property of a document, conditional on a verbal statement of need but not otherwise conditional on the circumstances of the searcher. To such authors, information has the character of objective data, just as recorded knowledge itself•e.g. the flat page of text•less contentiously has this character. This definition or concept is clearly 'the Cranfield' one, and the widespread usage of the term 'information retrieval' rests on it, perhaps so much so that few of the experimenters in our field appear to have recognised the magnitude of the question that the term 'retrieval' begs. Only Rees, perhaps, in the foundational days of our discipline, expressed scepticism in this regard [23] through his preference for the term 'document retrieval.' The mainstream of monographs appears to have kept to the Cranfield view, implicitly supporting the concept of 'information as data', i.e. as an objective, search-question specific, document-embedded, attribute, rather than as a cognitive process owned by an individual searcher at a particular time, and with which retrieved documents interact. With hindsight, and with respect to earlier researchers, one feels that reappraisal of the whole area, as facilitated by the Mira meetings for example, is now overdue. To illustrate the above definitions, if that is not 'overkill',we might consider a document in the form of a library of music CDs. These each record human knowledge, albeit knowledge of a particular kind. The effects on a human user (i.e. listener) of each and any CD constitute 'information' as we use the term in this paper, and we note that these effects do not reside on the CD tracks. (The CDs do not know the listener's age or musical experience, or the context in which he or she is hearing them, which are presumably factors influencing the searcher's reaction to them.) Historically, however, in the classical 'IS&R experiments', information has not been used in this way. Rather, it has been seen as an objective property of the CDs, so that if, for example, a searcher said 'Which CDs contain Radiohead tracks?', then those CDs with Radiohead tracks would be asserted to 'contain information relevant to the searcher' whether the searcher liked them (i.e. 'saw them as relevant') or not. There is no question here of the effect on the searcher of their being played when retrieved, being taken into account. One approach to relevance is process oriented and user-specific, the other is objective or topical. 
Encoding
Determines
The CRAN Model of Retrieval
To summarise our view, we note that the dominant paradigm of the discipline to date stems from the Cranfield experiments [24] , and is one where the evaluation of a search for information appears to be based on the following key assumptions. In stating these, we keep to our present usage of the term 'information', and not to the Cranfield concept.
• The searcher knows, in advance of the search, exactly what he or she wishes to know, i.e. that the information process to which he or she wishes to be party is accurately perceived by the searcher.
• The information process concerned is stable, i.e. does not influence the searcher's subjective perception of it when it is invoked (as evident by verbal behaviour) • The searcher's own knowledge of that information process can be rendered externally to his or cognition, through verbal behaviour expressed to an experimenter (or intermediary) and so provide a basis for reliable experimental procedures by which documents in the store being searched can be labelled as either contributing to that information process, or not contributing, when delivered to the searcher As we saw in the preceding section, this paradigm sees 'information' not as a cognitive process, but rather as an entity capable in principle of operational definition prior to retrieval taking place, and as such observable outside the searcher's mind. (We repeat that the terms 'storage' and 'retrieval' within the phrase 'information storage and retrieval' impose this meaning!) 'Information' in the language of the Cranfield experiments, is thus seen as an observable entity which is somehow embedded in or imbues documents. It assumes that it is something that is 'there for the taking', that it is user-independent or, to use a computing term, that it is not searcher 'aware'. The CRAN paradigm may then be reduced to the assumption that the knowledge growth of the searcher (i.e. the searcher's 'learning') is of the character of simple fact gathering.. Interaction between cognition and document at the point of use is minimal. Information is seen as concretised, i.e. separated from the database searcher's mind, and treated much as a fisherman might think of his potential catch, or a child might think of an object he has been told is in a bran tub (prior to digging in same.) The paradigm assumes a non-adaptive or passive (even 'dumb') learner, via its stipulation that the verbal criteria betokening 'success' in a document search are declarable in advance of the search, whether the documents that match those criteria can be found or not. The CRAN model is illustrated in Figure 1 . But to avoid a baby+bathwater scenario, let us immediately acknowledge the undoubted part validity of the CRAN model. As a practical example that supports this model, we might imagine a situation in which a searcher declared a need "to know the main functions of commercially-available computer-based learning tools" and then tries to 'retrieve' this information via a store of document records (or full-text documents.). His or her need would then be seen as met (for that particular store of documents) when all the documents that contained one or more descriptions of such functions were retrieved, and those that did not were not retrieved. The Cranfield paradigm seems unassailable here, and one might reasonably turn to the workhorses of P and R for evaluating the effects of whatever search expressions our user might input to the store. We are also absolutely clear that if a document could be found that (say) questioned the sufficiency of computer-based learning tools, this would be dismissed, under this paradigm, as 'outside scope', i.e. 'not relevant'. Similarly, a document in which its author pointed to functions of computerbased learning tools that would be useful if they were commercially implemented, but noted that they were not yet commercially available, would (by definition) also be deemed 'non-relevant.' One might feel rather sad for the searcher, that he or she had cast their need in such rigid, dogmatic terms, but if in conversation it was confirmed that he or she had indeed asked for exactly what they wanted, and that they were not interested in negotiating their need or the possibility of creatively responding to new knowledge, then any adverse consequences of the rigidity of their criterion would be their problem (if it is a problem) not ours.
The searcher adaptation and response (SAR) paradigm
Here, the view maintained by the paradigm is that information qua process is the only admissible view. Relevance is not about 'topics' or 'subjects', but is a responsive process situated in the mind of the individual searcher at search time, and influenced by the searcher's individuality (memory, skills, experience, aptitudes, etc) and immediate context in the world (organisational, professional, private, social). Here, we do not see information as objects to be shunted around somewhat mechanically, to be lifted from a document and then 'input' to a mind, but rather as an entity 'created on the fly' by human intelligence, and involving creative, adaptive partnership between mind and recorded knowledge, i.e. 'document'. Adopting this paradigm then leads ineluctably to one conclusion: 'Recall' under this paradigm is a meaningless construct. The Recall concept views knowledge as a priori, i.e. definable prior to document delivery, as the everyday meaning of the phrase 'to recall something' conveys. The numerical evaluation of 'Recall' in experiments accordingly depends on it being possible to say which documents would contribute to the information process were they to be retrieved. But within this paradigm information is seen as a process private to (or owned by) the individual, context-situated, searcher, so that such documents are unobservable in principle. (The searcher sees only retrieved documents.) To repeat, 'Recall' is then by definition meaningless. The effect of seeing relevance and information in these terms is thus to translate what has possibly seemed to be a somewhat academic analysis of the concept of relevance into both (1) a determinant of experimental design (pretagging of documents as 'relevant' or 'non-relevant' is then a meaningless procedure; relevance judgement by proxy is also meaningless; verbal behaviour in the searcher at the point of use needs to be sought in an appropriate way), and (2) a disenfranchising of one of the key and traditional variables that experimenters and others have used to describe system effectiveness. In case the argument for the SAR paradigm seems thin, the following quotations are offered in support of it. All appear to support the view that 'information' should not be seen (or at least seen solely) as an object, but rather as a 'process'.
" (Harter, [7] .) Earlier work which has (explicitly or implicitly) moved the paradigmatic viewpoint away from that which sees relevance as an a priori construct towards an a posteriori one, also notably includes [6] , where Cooper sees the set of retrieved documents as the only "reality" of the 2×2 table in operational systems; and the author's construction of 'Retrievality' [30] as the retrieval analogue of Salton's 'Generality'. Although apparently not rejecting the idea of information as having a priori status, Sparck Jones [31] has noted that different 'functional perspectives' on information can be recognised, wherein [information need] can be prompted by "quite distinct reasons, …as in e.g. writing a paper, indexing a paper, refereeing a paper, or seeking a paper." However, the early criticisms of Cranfield, such as those by Swanson [32] and Harter [33] , largely focus on the methods used to assess Recall, rather than on the validity of the Recall concept itself, i.e. on the meaningfulness of tagging non-retrieved documents as 'relevant'. Various recent writings, e.g. [34] [35] [36] [37] , have also addressed From our point of view, this shows insufficient awareness of the literature on relevance, which has increasingly cast doubt on the CRAN paradigm, seeing it as, in a sense, 'lying alongside' another one, which we have called SAR. (The author claims no innocence in this respect, his own experiments [39] [40] having also treated Recall uncritically.) Returning to the bathwater problem, we nevertheless need to accept that in some search circumstances the Recall concept may be regarded as valid, so that highly focused discussion on it (as is offered by Su [41] for example) is then justifiable. Patent searching is usually mentioned in this regard, but even under CRAN, a patent searcher may be looking for just one prior patent that might contest the eligibility of a claimed novel invention, and under SAR a patent database searcher doing a novelty check on a firm's proposed patentable invention, might identify a patented invention that does not contest the novelty of the proposed patent but is clearly of interest to the research team that created the invention. Buckland [42] provides examples where just one retrieved relevant item will apparently suffice (e.g. where the system user needs to know "the population of Klagenfurt in 1900, the cosine of 36 o , Nelson's last words…". (I have added 'apparently' here since there may be disagreement between sources as to what the population of Klagenfurt was in that year, and perhaps the angle of 36 o is on a sphere, and perhaps a document contains Nelson's last words but they are in Bulgarian and the user wanted them in English.) If, in response to the relevance theorists, we agree that the assumptions of CRAN are unwarrantedly strong, i.e. acceptable in some instances of information need but not all, and see cognition as actively involved in creating information in at least some document searches, then the results of evaluative studies that use these assumptions are of little value, as Swanson has suggested. Similarly, discussions that focus on the mathematical properties of Precision and Recall can be seen to be of only limited use to the managers of real-life information management systems•since they deny the reality of a learning searcher. The SAR is illustrated in Figure 2 . Lastly, in case the reader remains convinced that human cognition does always act according to the Cranfield assumptions, i.e. that it can always accurately foresee what it needs rather than (at least sometimes) creatively responds to what it beholds, we would draw analogies from the social sciences. The demand for medical services 
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tends to be strongly influenced by the availability of medical services, e.g. the number of available hospital beds, i.e. is 'supply driven' at least partly. The demand for books from public libraries has been shown to correlate strongly with the amount spent on books by the local authority. Again, demand (need) appears as strongly supply driven. We might also turn to advertising, where the whole of the industry is based on the principle that people's perceived needs for products and services (including many information products and services) are based on information about those products and services proactively disseminated to them. Again, demand (i.e. perceived need) is supply driven. Last, we might turn to technology in general. How many individuals, surveyed in the 1970s, say, as to their needs for new personal technology, would have expressed needs for the items we now call 'pagers', 'mobile phones' or 'Walkmen'? The perceived need (relevance) of such items seems almost totally supply driven. Such analogies readily convince one (if personal experience of document database searching does not!) that there will be documents in a database that are not perceived to be relevant at the time of query articulation, but which will be perceived as relevant if brought to the searcher's attention. Ergo, the SAR paradigm is not just a speculative possibility, but a very real facet of individuals' cognitive dispositions, and indeed one wonders why the alternative CRAN paradigm has become so entrenched in our thinking.
The CRAN and SAR paradigms and feedback systems
It is interesting to ask how the CRAN and SAR paradigms stand in regard to systems that support 'relevance feedback'. (For a recent review, see Harman [43] , the concept, of course, having originated with Salton.) The answer would seem to be complicated, and require distinctions between a 'learning searcher' and a 'learning search expression'. In some instances of cognition/database interaction, the feedback may be directed at search expression optimisation. The searcher in this situation can be either a learning searcher (the SAR paradigm applies) or one whose needs remain fixed with successive iterations of the search. If the feedback is directed at clarification of the need that is driving the search process, then by definition we are within the SAR paradigm.
Revision of P and R under the CRAN and SAR paradigms, and experimental realities 3.1 Reassessment of Precision
In general, subscripts should be given to effectiveness variables to signify the paradigm under whether the experiment is conducted. For example, if the experimenter has asked the searcher to flag all those retrieved documents that inform him, irrespective of their similarity or not to the initial (pre-search) statement of need by the searcher 3 , then this would determine a Precision value with a particular character that might be denoted by, say, P SAR .
If, on the other hand, the experimenter asked the searcher to flag all the retrieved documents that were in conformity with the original (pre-search, verbal) statement of, and recognition of, need, then this would determine a Precision value with a different character, which could be denoted by P CRAN . With 'Precision' in general, i.e. under either viewpoint (learning searcher or 'dumb' searcher), we are attempting to capture the intuitive notion of 'noise' in the retrieved documents.
Reassessment of Recall
Under CRAN we can, more or less comfortably, capture the notion of informativeness in the set of retrieved documents, using 'Recall'. This seems reasonably uncontentious where the search for knowledge (or rather 'the enablement of informing') is at the low level of fact-searching, however sophisticated the expression of the wanted fact may be. In that case, the paradigm admits no notion of information support other than which is rendered through the capture and scrutiny of pre-flagged (or rather 'pre-search flaggable') documents. Accordingly we can continue to use R, or if we wish 'R CRAN ' for emphasis, in this situation. The more important problem is rather one of identifying a substitute for R, i.e. a substitute measure of 'that which supports the information process', under the SAR paradigm. The author suggests that, with SAR, we move to a simple frequency measure rather than a probabilistic one, namely: the number of documents in the set of retrieve documents that inform the searcher, and denote this by N. We suggest the term 'informativeness' and will use this in the formal definitions below. We repeat here for emphasis the earlier point that Recall is a meaningless construct within the SAR paradigm. The reader may object that N is a redundant variable since if we know the Precision (under either paradigm) and also know the size of the set of retrieved documents, then N is immediately determined. (In other words, N equals P x k i , under either paradigm, where k i is the size of the set of retrieved documents on the ith search.) However, this is true only for a specific search instance (i.e. for a given searcher, fixed-in-time arbitration process, and search expression.) In other words, k i is not a constant across different search instances but varies from one search to another, as indeed the subscript to k emphasises. It is a random variable, just as N is, for a fixed value of Precision. N thus serves to capture a concept of informativeness that, in a sense, is parallel to 'Recall' but does so without having to assume that an 'entity' one might otherwise have labeled as information has a pre-search existence. An early reference to the idea of counting retrieved and informing documents, rather than moving to probabilities, is given by Swets [44] to a paper by Bornstein. [45] . One might reasonably argue that N, as defined, is in its way as simplistic a measure as R and P. But to accept this criticism, and reject N because of it (presumably along with R and P) would be to leave our science with an almost empty evaluative toolbox. One would then be left perhaps with innumerable tape-recording of conversations with searchers as to the effectiveness of their searches, and with little or no capacity to generalise from them in an objective manner. However, a more careful response would be to acknowledge the sense of the objection, and to say that N could be modified. We could ask the searcher to assign weights or (following Cooper) dollar-values to retrieved documents, and use aggregations of weight or dollar-value (perhaps normalised by the number of retrieved documents) as a measure to replace N. We use N notionally here in just that sense, i.e. as a placeholder measure that could (like R and P) be refined at will.
Bivariate measures
Measures such as D (further discussed by Shaw [46] ) or van Rijsbergen's E measure [47] , perhaps require to be carefully handled. For example, both can be expressed in a form that 'inherits' the variable R, which is unacceptable under SAR. The solution would seem to be to start by re-expressing them in terms of the basic sets involved. This is noted below for D, when we see that for the SAR paradigm, D SAR reduces to 1-P SAR .
Summary of suggested new measures
The following table summarises our suggestions
Measure of noise in the retrieved set
Measure of informativeness in the retrieved set CRAN paradigm P CRAN R
SAR paradigm P SAR N
Formal definitions of our new measures, in procedural and set terms are then as follows. The definitions assume that the retrieved set is not empty. We use n(…) to count the number of items in a set.
Define relevance-flagging procedures RFP-CRAN and RFP-SAR:
À RFP-CRAN is applied to the database as a whole, including all and any retrieved documents. Its starting point will be verbal behaviour by a searcher, or else verbal behaviour by an experimenter who seeks to emulate searcher verbal behaviour. Searcher-proxy implementations of this procedure, for non-retrieved documents, will almost certainly be needed in experimental studies in view of the size of modern databases. The procedure is not altered by the searcher's exposure to retrieved documents. À RFP-SAR is applied only to retrieved documents, and may vary from one retrieved set to another. Proxy implementations of it are not necessary in experiments. The searcher applies the procedure, private to his or her mind, directly to retrieved documents. 
An integrated paradigm
In the 'real world', of which we hear so much, real people doing real searches can be observed to respond to searches in both a 'CRAN' and an 'SAR' way. An aircraft engineer may begin a search by looking for documents on fatigue in aluminium alloys, and yet have her attention drawn by a retrieved document that refers to bacterial corrosion of those alloys. A sixth former searching for information on the Gaia concept may find himself drawn to articles on plate tectonics. Such a searcher could be said to be operating in 'joint mode', interested in both the problem as it was originally expressed, and yet open to the possibility of a redefinition of that problem. The question then arises as to how we might describe search effectiveness in such a situation? The author suggests that one sensible approach would seem to be: 1. To retain set A as a partially valid construct, and to recognise informing documents in the retrieved set, B, as those that inform the searcher in either way. In formal terms, this 'either' is represented by the documents in B*∪B~. Let us denote the latter set, the set of all documents that inform the search, whether by way of surprise and creative involvement, or by way of their matching a pre-set statement of need, by B T (using 'T' for 'total'.)
2. To retain Recall, R, just as it was defined under CRAN (since it remains meaningless except in that regard. 
Diagrammatic representation of the three paradigms
The three paradigms we have discussed, namedly CRAN, SAR and the integrated paradigm described above, are illustrated in Figure 4 .
Further discussion
It is appreciated that in this discussion we have both made simplifying assumptions and limited the factors being taken into account. In the author's view, the main factors that would need to be considered next are:
• The effect on relevance decisions of the order in which documents in a retrieved set are examined, when the experiment is conducted under the regime of SAR, e.g. controlled randomness in the order in which retrieved documents are presented to the subject. (With CRAN, of course, order of presentation is, by definition, immaterial.) It is difficult to see what else could be done. Presenting retrieved documents from the same search expression to the same searcher would be to ignore learning effects.
• Whether the searcher is making judgements on metadocuments (i.e., bibliographical descriptions + abstracts, say) or full-text documents (e.g. Web pages, full-text electronic articles.) But for full-text searching the assumptions are similar. But presumably this is not a 'problem' but simply a matter to be declared by the experimenter, who in fact may be interested in the differences in effects of such different presentations. 
Conclusions
The effectiveness of document identification systems, traditionally but presumptuously called information retrieval systems 4 , has been customarily evaluated using 'Recall' and 'Precision' values, although the validity of these measures has attracted long-standing controversy. One criticism of them is centred on the nature of document 'relevance', which Recall in particular sees as being knowable, and fixed in advance of the search, notwithstanding both creative involvement of the searcher in retrieved documents, and the problems in principle of knowing what is inaccessible to the searcher. Published discussion on the nature of relevance (dating back to the 1960s) has attempted to disambiguate this concept into sub-concepts of (1) document 'topicality' (aboutness, subject), where cognition may be regarded as a largely passive receiver of objective knowledge in the document, and (2) 'situational' or 'subjective' relevance, where the interaction of document and cognition is creative, individual-specific, and context-and time-specific. However, experimentalists in the field of document retrieval effectiveness appear to have largely ignored this distinction, as is evident by the continued, unmodified, use of Recall and Precision. We have offered refinements to the choice and use of these measures which incorporate the above distinction, and also offered a unifying paradigm that takes both into account jointly. If the basic distinction as to types of relevance, and the suggested use of refined variables, are accepted, then it follows that future evaluation studies should: (1) state clearly which of the two definitions of relevance (information) is recognised in the study, (2) subscript the variable 'Precision' appropriately so as to eliminate needless ambiguity as to what this measure means in that particular experiment, (3) either adopt or reject the 'Recall' concept, as is appropriate to the aim of the experiment, and (4) in the case of investigations of situation relevance, where 'Recall' is meaningless, adopt a new measure of relevance, namely 'Informativeness', N, in place of R. The latter variable, as would P SAR , would appear to be particularly useful in studies of those sequences of searches where relevance is treated as if it has a dynamic property.
In summary, to answer the question posed in the title of this paper, it is suggested we should not abandon P and R but show much more care than we have done in choosing when and how to use them.
